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Until last summer, key equipment linking Greenland’s undersea cables to North America and Europe was supplied and managed by a company linked to China’s Huawei, raising security concerns as the U.S. moves to expand its military presence on the island under a new defense pact.
Undersea cable control terminals were produced, installed and operated by Huawei Marine Networks, a joint venture majority-owned by Huawei Technologies that was later sold to Hengtong Optic-Electric and rebranded as HMN Technologies — both of which the U.S. government has sanctioned — because of their ties to Huawei Technologies, a state-linked Chinese telecommunications giant sanctioned for electronic espionage and potential sabotage.
Amid security concerns, Greenland’s government telecom provider, Tusass, announced in August that the terminals were replaced with more secure European-made equipment.
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The announcement was made a month before the U.S., Denmark and Greenland — an autonomous Danish territory whose defense and foreign affairs are still controlled by Denmark — signed a defense pact that will bring additional military bases and potentially weapons and sensors for the Golden Dome missile defense system.
President Trump celebrated the defense pact again Tuesday with a social media post in which he wrote that “massive” oil, gas and mineral exploration will begin soon on “our new and beautiful Greenland!” The island, he added, will provide the U.S. with offensive and defensive security “second to none.”
“Any future attack on the United States will have to come across Greenland, where our Defense will routinely knock down drones, missiles, or any other form of weapon not yet even conceived,” he wrote. “It gives us time, location, and sightline, like nowhere else in the World!”
Despite Huawei’s exit, security experts warn that risks remain: For at least a decade, Huawei operated within Greenland’s communications backbone via submarine line terminal equipment, or SLTEs, potentially leaving behind vulnerabilities that persist today.
The terminals are the most critical components of undersea cable networks. They receive, repair and regenerate fiber optic signals passing through the cables. They are critical for transforming undersea fiber optic light signals into usable data.
Greenland’s two undersea cables were built by Tele Greenland, a predecessor of Tusass, with Huawei Marine supplying SLTE terminal equipment upgrades for both systems in 2016-2017.
Huawei Marine was later renamed HMN Technologies, and both remain on the Commerce Department’s official Entity List, the blacklist of companies that pose U.S. national security threats. The parent company, Huawei Technologies, is also a designated Chinese military company based on its ties to Beijing’s military-civil fusion program, which requires all civilian firms to support the military.
The Greenland Connect cable became operational in March 2009, followed by the Greenland Connect North cable trunk in 2017.
Replaced, but questions remain
Tusass, Greenland’s state-owned national postal and telecommunications firm, announced Aug. 21 — a month before the new defense agreement was signed Sept. 22 — that it had completed the replacement of unspecified SLTE equipment on both cables with more secure equipment from the European companies Itectra and Nokia.
Paarnaq Hansen-Zeeb, Tusass’ chief spokeswoman, declined to say if the new terminals replaced the Huawei terminals. The new terminals were installed under a regular technology lifecycle management, she said.
Ms. Hansen-Zeeb said, “Security and reliability are fundamental priorities for Tusass.”
It could not be determined which specific equipment was replaced and whether steps were taken to determine whether Huawei had planted clandestine listening devices in the network.
Remaining security questions about the Huawei gear include whether Chinese firmware remained in place and whether Huawei retained remote management access.
Also, a forensic examination of the old equipment could reveal Huawei’s exploitation of the cable terminals.
Ms. Hansen-Zeeb declined to provide details, citing the company’s policy of not discussing security assessments and actions.
The European Union recognized the undersea cable threat in a July declaration with Greenland and Denmark, noting the need for “secure, resilient, and smart submarine cables, satellite and backbone infrastructures.”
The Huawei terminals were operated at landing stations for the 3,358-mile Greenland Connect cable in Canada at Milton, Trinity Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador; in Greenland at the capital, Nuuk and Qaqortoq; and at Landeyjarsandur in Iceland.
The 420-mile northern cable links Nuuk with the remote towns of Maniitsoq, Sisimiut and Aasiaat.
What experts say is at risk
Despite Huawei’s exit, security experts warn that the potential for clandestine cyber espionage and large data collection from all communications to and from Greenland may persist. Long-term access likely provided China with valuable information useful for intelligence gathering or for sabotaging communications links in a future crisis or conflict.
Among the potential security threats are:
• Monitoring network status and traffic patterns.
• Identifying key links used heavily.
• Gathering metadata from transiting data.
• Manipulating routing or network configurations.
• Obtaining credentials and other administrative information.
• Potentially intercepting traffic through the planting of clandestine listening and control devices.
Long-term access to the control equipment could also mean Chinese backdoors into the new equipment.
Although the terminal equipment is commercial technology, Huawei’s long-term access for operations, repair and maintenance poses potential security risks of clandestine insertion of electronic spying equipment in the network.
Commercial and public information gathered by China through the Huawei equipment would also be shared with the People’s Liberation Army under Beijing’s current military-civil fusion policy.
The use of equipment by a Chinese commercial firm that is part of Beijing’s state strategy for global expansion poses a supply chain risk, the State Department said.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said U.S. involvement in Greenland is more important than ever before and necessary to prevent China from controlling the Arctic. The region is now “an area of incredible competition,” he said.
“Multiple countries, including countries that are not Arctic countries that call themselves near-Arctic countries like China, are out there operating every single day trying to dominate sea lanes, which are important for global shipping and commerce,” Mr. Rubio told Fox News on Sept. 28.
Access to Greenland is also critical for U.S. “space warfare” and missile defenses, he said. “In order to build the sort of missile defense this country needs to protect itself, Greenland is incredibly important for all of North America,” Mr. Rubio said. He added that the new agreement gives the U.S. the ability to secure Greenland.
Asked about security concerns related to Huawei’s undersea communications infrastructure in Greenland, a State Department official said ensuring that trusted suppliers build, maintain and repair undersea cable networks is a critical national and economic security imperative for the U.S. and should be for all nations.
“We will continue to work closely with Greenland and Denmark to protect critical infrastructure and prevent new investments by untrusted suppliers,” the official told The Washington Times, speaking on background.
A spokesman for the Danish Embassy referred questions about the Greenland cable risk to the Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen. A ministry spokesman did not respond to a request for comment.
A Foreign Ministry spokesman said comments on the cable equipment were being formulated at press time.
China views Greenland as a key element in its Polar Silk Road initiative. A central feature of the initiative is securing a future trading route through melting northern sea ice.
Beijing also has sought access to Greenland’s rare earth minerals, potential satellite receiving infrastructure and telecommunications, according to a report by the Danish Institute for International Studies on Arctic security.
The new U.S. defense agreement, although short of Mr. Trump’s plan to buy Greenland, is a setback for China.
Mr. Rubio said that under the new Greenland defense pact, “never will any adversary of the United States have the ability to invest there without our approval and their approval, but also we will have access to building new military facilities that will allow us to build the sort of missile defense shield that all of North America needs.”
Greenland boasts the world’s seventh-largest known rare earth reserves — a major point of contention between the U.S. and China after Beijing restricted exports of rare earth minerals last year.
The one-year suspension of new rare earth export controls by China expires in November.
China signed an agreement to mine uranium in Greenland in 2014, but the deal was blocked by Denmark under pressure from environmental groups.
The same location, at Kvanefjeld on the island’s southeastern tip, reportedly contains about 1.14 million tons of rare earth oxides.
Rep. John Moolenaar, Michigan Republican and chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, said the Greenland defense agreement enables the U.S. to permanently secure Greenland.
“China has often tried to stake false claims in the Arctic, and this agreement will ensure it never has a foothold in Greenland,” Mr. Moolenaar said.
Huawei was blocked from a joint project for a nearby undersea cable system through the Arctic with Finland’s state-owned Cinia when the project was killed in 2021 over concerns about Chinese spying.
That planned undersea cable system, called Arctic Connect, would have increased Chinese defensive and offensive intelligence-gathering capabilities, according to a report by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
“Moreover, as data cables can also be used for gathering military surveillance information, there are worries that Arctic Connect could be turned into an undersea surveillance system,” the report said.
Where the new bases fit in
The Greenland defense agreement signed in New York last month includes an espionage provision stating that the U.S. can raise concerns about intelligence threats and “work together to counter espionage in Greenland.”
The pact calls for adding two more military bases on the coasts and possibly an unmanned defense base farther inland on the massive ice-bound island.
One of the new bases will be at Narsarsuaq on the southwest coast, at the former U.S. World War II base, Bluie West One, which was closed in 1958.
That site would be reliant on the Greenland Connect cable that used Huawei terminal gear.
A second new base is expected at the east coast port of Mestersvig, which is not part of the Greenland internet grid but likely could be added in the future.
Equipment for the new Golden Dome U.S. missile and drone defense system is also planned for Greenland.
The lone U.S. military base now in Greenland is Space Force Base Pituffik in the northwest, used for missile warning, missile defense and space surveillance. Pituffik will be expanded under the agreement.
That base is not linked to the Greenland Connect and Greenland Connect North undersea cables; it relies instead on satellite communications.
Greenland will assist Golden Dome
The new defense agreement also seeks to restrict Russian bombers’ access to Greenland and will provide an important location for Golden Dome defenses against long-range Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles.
U.S. intelligence officials disclosed in September 2014 that two Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers were tracked flying a route across the northern Atlantic near Iceland, Greenland and Canada’s northeast.
The bombers conducted practice cruise missile attacks on the United States during a training mission, the officials said, raising fears of attacks on the homeland among commanders at the U.S. Northern Command.
Analysis of the bomber flight indicated the aircraft were conducting practice runs to a predetermined “launch box,” an optimum point for firing nuclear-armed cruise missiles at U.S. targets, said officials familiar with intelligence reports.
The flights have continued regularly as part of Moscow’s nuclear saber-rattling.
In 2022, then-NORTHCOM commander Gen. Glen VanHerck called Russia a top military threat to the homeland, noting the approximately 3,100-mile-range Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile as a major threat.
“I need [a domestic cruise missile defense system] yesterday, candidly,” the general told Scientific American.
’Network security is national security’
The long-term use of the Huawei terminal gear remains a significant national security concern.
Retired Vice Adm. Mike McConnell, NSA director from 1992 to 1996, said the threat from the Huawei infrastructure is about control.
“Let me say this from being the former director of the National Security Agency; when you have access and control to the network, you have control,” said Mr. McConnell, who also served as director of national intelligence from 2007 to 2009.
“Network security is national security, and if you give your network to a foreign hostile power, you’ve lost national security,” he said.
Through Huawei, Chinese intelligence and security agencies could collect and manipulate transiting data, exploit the network for other intelligence gathering or cyberespionage, or engage in sabotage through degradation, he said.
Repair ships, undersea tapping
Jason Hsu, a Hudson Institute China expert, said HMN Technologies, formerly known as Huawei Marine, is a state-linked company that could assist the Chinese military in cutting undersea cables during a crisis or conflict, or help with electronic spying by tapping underwater fiber-optic lines through maintenance and repair operations.
The underwater cables are the backbone of the modern global economy and carry 97% to 99% of all intercontinental internet traffic, handling financial transactions, military communications, cloud computing and digital activity by billions of people.
China has already demonstrated undersea cable cutting around Taiwan, Mr. Hsu told the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.
“The subsea cable threat from China is not a hypothetical concern for the future; it is a present and escalating danger,” Mr. Hsu said.
HMN Technologies is a key element of the Chinese Communist Party’s Digital Silk Road initiative that seeks to expand Beijing’s commercial and political influence worldwide through technology programs in the developing world.
“For U.S. allies and partners, allowing China to dominate subsea cable construction and ownership in emerging markets would increase the risk that Beijing could conduct surveillance, intercept data or deliberately disrupt networks,” Mr. Hsu said.
Undersea espionage by China could include placing electronic interception devices on cables and conducting reconnaissance of U.S. military communications links under the guise of cable repair, he said.
Cable repair vessels require details of cable routes and access points that “makes them potential instruments for intelligence collection,” Mr. Hsu said.
A report by the Atlantic Council on undersea cable security found that cable terminals are connected globally, enabling remote access and increasing their vulnerability to monitoring and disruption of cable traffic in a crisis or conflict.
“Once in control of cable companies’ remote management systems, these attackers could wreak this kind of havoc on Internet traffic flows from their keyboards, miles away,” the report said.
Cold War precedent
Underwater electronic espionage is not theoretical. The National Security Agency pioneered deep-sea eavesdropping in its Operation Ivy Bells, which used submarines to plant listening devices on Soviet cables beneath the Sea of Okhotsk near the Kamchatka Peninsula.
The operation came to light during the prosecution of Ronald Pelton, an NSA spy for Moscow who sold details of the operation to the KGB beginning in 1980. Pelton was arrested in 1985 and convicted of spying in 1986.
A report by the Danish intelligence service, which is responsible for security in Greenland, identified China as among the foreign states conducting operations against Greenland.
The activities include influence operations and espionage, including cyberattacks. “In addition, China and Russia are interested in complicating the positions of the USA and other western states” in the region, the report by the service known by its acronym PET stated.
Mr. McConnell, the former NSA director, said Huawei’s threat to the internet is global and includes taking control of large swaths of the internet infrastructure.
“Now, if you control the global telecommunications infrastructure, you control the world, right?” Mr. McConnell said. “You can turn it off, you can slow it down, you can exploit it, you can use it for destruction or degradation.”
The retired three-star, now chairman of the board at Ericsson Federal Technologies Group, is urging the U.S. government to launch a major international effort to prevent Huawei and China from controlling the internet.
“This is an existential threat of strategic proportions,” he said.
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