Gas prices are soaring. The U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars. American service members have been killed. And the Republican Party may face a voter backlash in November.

So, has the Iran war been worth it so far?

Rep. Gabe Evans, Colorado Republican and an Army veteran, defended the conflict during a recent appearance on the Threat Status weekly podcast. He argued it was past time for the U.S. to “rip that Band-Aid off” and deal with the “festering” issue of Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.

“I’m confident that we are going to get this wrapped up. Once it’s wrapped up, gas prices are going to drop,” Mr. Evans said.

There’s another, even bigger question at the heart of the U.S.-Iran war: Is it even still going on?

That should be easy to answer, but it isn’t. The Middle East conflict has morphed from a barrage of U.S.-Israeli airstrikes to a drawn-out stalemate involving sea skirmishes, economic blockades and thorny diplomatic talks.

For Mr. Trump, there was a reason to argue the war was over: He needed to circumvent a War Powers Resolution deadline that gives the president 60 days to either end hostilities or obtain congressional authorization to continue them.

Yet the U.S. is still enforcing a major blockade of Iranian ports, widely seen as an act of war under international law.

It’s a question on everyone’s mind at this week’s SOF Week convention in Tampa: Will Special Operations Command receive a major budget increase, exceeding the relatively modest hike in the proposed fiscal 2027 spending plan?

Here’s why it’s important: Key lawmakers and military insiders say the Pentagon’s increasing reliance on Special Operations Forces — elite units such as the Green Berets, Navy SEALs and the famed Delta Force — has not been adequately matched in the military’s ballooning budget. There’s a growing sense in high-level national security circles and on Capitol Hill that a deep disconnect exists between the rapidly changing nature of 21st-century combat and the relatively light investment in the select, unconventional units tasked with America’s most difficult and sensitive military missions.

Those missions include the daring January raid to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from a heavily guarded compound in a foreign capital.

By contrast, outspoken special forces advocates say, modern-day capabilities such as drones and long-range artillery will prohibit the U.S. from massing ground forces, tank formations and even traditional maritime assets. That will likely make the Pentagon even more reliant on its elite special forces units in the years to come.

Asia Editor Andrew Salmon examines the new reality of modern warfare, an evolution underscored by the Russia-Ukraine war. Low-tech, easy-to-obtain, disposable arms can confound even the strongest military superpowers.

Despite being outnumbered and outgunned, the Ukrainian military has shown the vulnerability of Russia’s big-ticket, high-tech platforms, such as its warships, armored fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, radar and other sensor units. Many of those have been decimated by affordable Ukrainian drones. When combined with highly accurate satellite reconnaissance data, those cheap drones cast a wide, sharp light across the battle space, making concentrating forces ultra-risky. Once identified, the concentration’s coordinates are accelerated up the kill chain to both artillery and strike drones.

And it’s helping Ukraine close the manpower gap. Small drones are taking over dangerous battlefield tasks traditionally undertaken by specialist troops. ISR — intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance — drones are appropriating the jobs of artillery observation officers, scouts and spies.

The lessons extend beyond the Russia-Ukraine war. The vulnerability of U.S. troops to potential Iranian drone attacks is one reason Army or Marine Corps personnel didn’t go ashore in Iran.

Chinese President Xi Jinping was about as clear as he could be during his meeting with Mr. Trump last week in Beijing. The message, according to Michael McKenna, was obvious: Trade is great and we care about it, but really, we are focused on taking Taiwan and you need to let that happen. Mr. McKenna, a columnist for The Washington Times, is president of MWR Strategies.

And now the U.S. must be equally clear.

Mr. McKenna argues in a new op-ed for The Times that the longstanding U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity — leaving open the question of whether the American military would defend Taiwan from an attack by Communist China — has run its course.

“The American approach to Taiwan has been one of strategic ambiguity, a posture that allows all people to believe all things about any specific situation. We are probably beyond that at this point,” Mr. McKenna writes. “If the United States is willing to defend Taiwan, should we be asked, we need to be clear about that. Resolve on the part of one’s potential enemy is an important deterrence.”

• May 18-21 — Special Operations Forces Week 2026, Global SOF Foundation

• May 19 — Environmental Agendas, Geopolitical Ends: Climate Policy and Great Power Competition, Hudson Institute

• May 19 — U.S.-China Artificial Intelligence Competition: A Fireside Chat with Chairman Brian Mast, Center for a New American Security

• May 20 — Sen. Bernie Moreno, Ohio Republican, on Colombia’s 2026 Elections, Atlantic Council

• May 20 — A Conversation with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Sarah B. Rogers, Hudson Institute

• May 21 — Fatih Birol, International Energy Agency Executive Director, on the Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Global Energy Security, Chatham House

• May 22 — What Are the Biggest Space Threats in 2026? Center for Strategic and International Studies

• May 26 — High Wire: The Sheinbaum Administration and the Future of U.S.-Mexico Relations, Brookings Institution