OPINION:
America’s ability to combat and defend against adversaries in the information domain is declining, largely because of structural constraints rooted in outdated requirements and acquisition processes, as well as profit-driven disincentives to innovation.
Substantial investments in influence programs have yielded minimal returns compared with the scale of those investments. One major factor is an excessive reliance on commercial marketing firms instead of in-house warfighter training, equipping and staffing.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has noted this challenge. He said that “the defense industry financially benefits from our backward culture” and that there exists “an absence of urgency, a fear of innovation.”
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Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google and founder of the defense tech startup Perennial Autonomy (formerly known as White Stork), said in a September interview that “the side that scales innovation fastest will win.”
Regrettably, the United States may be predisposed to fail unless it adopts aggressive acquisition reforms that incentivize innovation and give the government greater control over hiring. Reforms must introduce new technologies and reallocate funds to expand the pool of experts, vendors and technologies more quickly and flexibly.
People with extensive experience in information warfare have observed that, for the past 25 years, the U.S. military has systematically dismantled, de-emphasized and underfunded an influence-related force structure. It has instead relied increasingly on mission privatization.
There is significant ambiguity about what constitutes the information “problem,” impeding the development of a common understanding of the tools and capabilities needed to address these challenges in the most mission-relevant and cost-effective way.
The workforce at the Combatant Command level consists primarily of contractors rather than military or government personnel. Once a prime contractor is selected, it has near-absolute control, often sidelining mission-critical adjustments when they conflict with the contractor’s commercial interests.
Contractor agreements typically last for five years. That is a considerable duration in the innovation life cycle, particularly in rapidly evolving artificial intelligence. Many former government and military colleagues have reported instances in which contractors blocked AI-driven innovations by refusing to adopt tools that would replace profitable “butts in seats.”
This resistance occurred despite the potential to save millions of dollars and enhance U.S. effectiveness in information warfare.
The degradation of the military’s organic information forces and capabilities is self-inflicted. Although significant restrictions were placed on the use of Blackwater in Iraq, similar limitations were not imposed on contractor-led information forces.
Beginning in the early 2000s, as mission requirements expanded beyond what available forces could handle, the military became increasingly dependent on marketing firms and contractor support. This fostered a generation of officers and enlisted personnel accustomed to a landscape in which privatized campaigns were the norm.
Consequently, military force structures failed to expand to address the gap, specialized skills were lost, and psychological operations forces were mostly relegated to the rear echelon. Outsourcing “influence” to high-overhead, profit-driven enterprises may shift public attitudes, but it typically offers limited value in altering beliefs or behaviors in authoritarian societies.
Outsourcing influence also costs more than the innovative techniques employed by adversaries.
A growing consensus within government circles holds that marketing firms’ role contravenes Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 7.5, which stipulates that contracts should not be used for “inherently governmental functions.” In military operations, contractors may provide analysis, planning assistance, technical evaluations and policy options, but they may not conduct influence operations outside military command and control.
The overreliance on marketing firms has diminished the mission space and responsibilities of information forces. More critically, while it drains precious resources through overhead costs, it impedes the military’s ability to receive timely feedback and implement corrective action to address unintended consequences. This is particularly vital in situations involving transnational criminal organizations and hybrid warfare.
Despite ongoing congressional interest and Defense Department reviews, these challenges persist. The fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act sought to improve oversight and coordination of the principal information operations adviser position, now the deputy assistant secretary of war for strategic influence and information policy.
However, this office employs only one staff member with experience in psychological operations and has yet to implement a comprehensive, top-down oversight program. In executing this authority, the office should regularly conduct a thorough review of program-level spending and resource allocation related to influence.
This review should confirm whether such expenditures align with administration priorities, the secretary’s call for cost reduction and the adoption of innovative practices, while ensuring compliance with the stipulations outlined in FAR 7.5.
The Defense Department is already taking a major step by pursuing comprehensive acquisition reforms. It must now shift the balance of power in acquisition vehicles back to the customer.
Such a move would empower government leaders with complete authority over the quality of hires, timing and implementation of innovative solutions and the ability to expand competition beyond the limited circle of providers associated with any given vehicle. That includes requiring open-ended technology demonstrations and competitions.
Finally, Congress and the department should evaluate the structure of information-related disciplines across the entire joint force to identify a balanced, integrated approach that effectively addresses the challenges of a rapidly evolving threat landscape.
• Josh “Bugsy” Segal, a retired U.S. Navy information warfare officer, is a freelance consultant to the Department of Defense who helped stand up the Office of the Principal Information Advisor and the Joint Staff Information Integration Division and previously served on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the naval inspector general.
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