SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea’s new ties to Russia have been well reported, but Kim Jong-un apparently isn’t the only Korean leader cozying up to Vladimir Putin.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s administration has surprised international analysts in recent weeks with a series of moves that signal warming relations with Moscow — from South Korea facilitating the sale of Russian fuel and a new trade route deal utilizing Russia’s Arctic sea lanes to an escalating diplomatic feud with Ukraine.
In hindsight, the South Korean president’s Russian lean could have been anticipated.
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On Sept. 23, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy revealed, at the United Nations General Assembly, that Kyiv had transferred two North Korean prisoners of war — who, while fighting alongside Russia, were captured by Ukrainian troops — to South Korea.
On Sept. 24, Mr. Lee accused Mr. Zelenskyy of breaching a bilateral confidentiality agreement on the transfer.
Analysts in Seoul reckoned Mr. Lee feared the relatives of POWs would suffer collective punishment if they defected — but their faces had been revealed by media months earlier.
In a tweet on X, Mr. Lee also accused Mr. Zelenskyy of trying to instigate an inter-Korean clash.
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry subsequently admitted to local media that no written confidentiality agreement existed, but Mr. Lee demanded an apology.
Kyiv did not satisfy Seoul’s demands, leading Seoul to withdraw its ambassador and reduce its embassy staff.
It was not Mr. Lee’s first verbal attack on the Ukrainian leader.
During a televised debate in Seoul in February 2022, just three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Lee stated, “A novice politician of six months became president and declared [Ukraine’s] accession to NATO, which provoked Russia and eventually led to a clash.”
After Mr. Lee became president in June 2025, he toned down the public skepticism directed at Mr. Zelenskyy.
Speaking at the 2026 NATO Summit, in Ankara, Turkey, on June 7, he said, “Safeguarding democracy, freedom and peace is not the responsibility of any one country alone,” adding that Korea “will be your most trusted partner.”
That was a likely reference to the arms Seoul has sold to Europe — but not Ukraine — and his ambition to make Korea the world’s No. 4 arms exporter.
Complicating that ambition may be a key personnel appointment.
One day before he demanded an apology from Kyiv, on Oct. 1, Mr. Lee named veteran politician Song Young-gil as his advisor on “peace and diplomacy.”
Mr. Song is noted for his links to Russia. In 2013, he was decorated by Mr. Putin for advancing Moscow-Seoul relations, and in 2017, he served under the liberal Moon Jae-in administration as special envoy to Moscow.
Access to the Arctic
Prior to his elevation of Mr. Song, and to the row over the POWs, Mr. Lee had noted approvingly a pioneering voyage undertaken by a South Korean vessel.
On Aug. 22, a container ship left port in Busan for Europe on a course that took it eastward, northward, then westward. It cruised the length of Russia’s northern littoral before docking at the British port of Felixstowe on Sept. 12, followed by stops in the Netherlands and Poland.
It was the first time a South Korean vessel had transited the Northern Sea Route, also known as the Arctic Route, to Europe.
The route cuts Asia-Europe sea voyage times by 30-40 percent. Ice had previously made it non-navigable for most of the year, but climate change makes it increasingly viable.
It runs almost entirely within Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, granting Moscow potentially valuable leverage via access control. Some worry that expanded route use will empower the Kremlin.
At an Oct. 13 ceremony in Busan celebrating the voyage, Mr. Lee called the transit “a meaningful challenge.”
He pledged that Korea “will move to open the Arctic Ocean route,” and will “thoroughly abide by international norms and principles on sanctions while communicating sufficiently with key countries for cooperation.”
Just days earlier, news had broken of a different — and more secretive — format of Korea-Russian cooperation.
An Oct. 6 investigation by Britain’s Guardian newspaper found that in July and August — amid Ukrainian attacks on Russian refiners — South Korean vessels had transferred some 150,000 tons of fuel, via ports and at sea, to seven Russian vessels, including ships sanctioned by Australia, the EU and Britain.
Seoul said the transfers were not illegal, but is investigating. Kyiv responded with anger.
What is Lee thinking?
Experts are puzzled by Mr. Lee’s moves.
“It is hard to make sense of it, to think of it as a coherent strategy,” said Dan Pinkston, a Seoul-based international relations professor with Troy University. “Is it personal?”
As for whether Mr. Lee seeks Russian help in reopening doors to Pyongyang, he was dubious.
“I think that’s fantasy,” Mr. Pinkston said. “Is it long-term and sustainable? Does South Korea want to hitch its wagon to Russia?”
Post-Cold War, bilateral ties expanded swiftly, particularly as Russia is a proximate energy exporter to South Korea, a net importer. Even today, Russians require no visas to visit South Korea, and enjoy a direct ferry link via Vladivostok.
“Historically, Korea was the friendliest of U.S. allies to Russia,” said Fyodor Tertitskiy, a Moscow-born historian with Seoul’s Korea University.
Yet, bilateral commerce was never massive: In 2020, Russia was just South Korea’s 10th largest trade partner. That suggests personal issues are at play.
“President Lee has a liking for authoritarian leaders like Putin and [Chinese president] Xi,” Mr. Tertitskiy said. “And he would be ecstatic to meet Kim Jong-un — if he could.”
At a time when Seoul-Washington ties are frayed over a stalled Korean investment pledge and disagreements over the transfer of wartime operational control of South Korean troops to sovereign command, Mr. Lee’s stance aligns him — likely coincidentally — with Washington.
U.S. President Trump has demanded Ukraine hold an election, potentially unseating Mr. Zelenskyy.
Elsewhere, Mr. Lee’s strategic thinking may be blinkered.
“The consensus within the South Korean foreign policy community seems to be that Lee wants to preserve his strategic space,” said Rob York, of Hawaii-based think tank Pacific Forum. “He wants to continue selling weapons to Europe … however he reserves the right to expand ties with Russia.”
A major question mark overhangs that.
“The question,” Mr. York said, “is whether European nations will hold Lee’s government accountable for his hedging.”
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