OPINION:
A tense calm has prevailed in Lebanon since Israel’s military withdrew to the “yellow line” outlined in the June ceasefire between the two countries.
Progress on the trajectory outlined in the ceasefire agreement is stalled. No positive movement has been made since three villages were transferred to the Lebanese Armed Forces this summer to serve as “pilot areas” of a new peace arrangement.
Hezbollah’s presence in those villages is not overt, but it is well known. The Lebanese army, meanwhile, has refrained from confronting the terrorist organization and, as in the past, continues to demand additional foreign assistance and resources to enable more assertive operations.
People were interested in these podcasts
Meanwhile, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, the dedicated monitoring force for Lebanon, finally appears to have accepted the end of its mandate at the end of this year. France and other countries, however, are still refusing to bid adieu to nearly half a century of military presence in the region. They are attempting to devise a framework for another international force in southern Lebanon.
Although that shift has garnered little attention, it reflects a change in how the international community views its role in Lebanon. UNIFIL was first deployed in 1978 after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, with a mandate to confirm Israeli withdrawal and help restore Lebanese government authority in the area, and its role was always connected to a demilitarization of the area, initially by Palestinian terrorist groups, later by Hezbollah.
Now, however, the French are not linking the presence of a military force to any demilitarization agreement. They are arguing that a military presence in the area is necessary to prevent escalation and support the local population.
That position is a vote of no confidence in the Lebanese state’s ability to act on behalf of its citizens in the south and prevent a resurgence of an Iranian and Hezbollah presence in the area.
France has good reason for its pessimism. On both sides of the ceasefire line, active military preparations are underway for a continuation of the conflict.
Israel’s security belt in Lebanese territory is now deeper and more substantial than it was in the past, but its actual security situation has deteriorated, not improved.
After being beaten back last year, Hezbollah has now returned to southern Lebanon as a full-fledged military force. It is deploying and entrenching its combat units directly along the ceasefire line with the intention of waging a war of attrition against Israel Defense Forces soldiers from there, and perhaps even renewing its threat of a large-scale attack on Israeli territory.
More ominously, Iran’s terrorist proxy of choice is also busy transforming its military capabilities. Informed by the lessons of the war in Ukraine and by the localized successes Hezbollah achieved this spring using first-person view drones against IDF forces, the organization is now investing enormous energy in establishing attack drone formations.
This emerging capability increasingly threatens IDF forces in the tactical security belt in southern Lebanon and provides the terrorist army the capability to bypass that security belt altogether and target vulnerable communities in northern Israel with impunity.
An effective defense against these systems has yet to be developed on the Israeli side. Without one, the threat could become almost as severe as the threat from the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023. An intensive drone assault by Hezbollah could paralyze the movement of IDF forces, blind sensors, disable communications nodes, strike civilian targets and, in the most serious scenario, enable an invasion from Lebanon into Israeli territory through a paralyzed security belt.
Israel is closely monitoring these developments, but military planners understand the broader implications. In the global military competition between defense and offense, attacking FPV drones presently hold the upper hand — and by a wide margin.
Many observers assume that the most likely cause of a regional escalation will be renewed Iranian-American tensions in the Persian Gulf — and that those would likely draw Israel and Lebanon into the conflict. The prevailing assumption seems to be that the current paralysis in Lebanon can continue for an extended period.
Yet Hezbollah’s dramatic buildup and the nature of its new weapons suggest a different dynamic. Odds are that by the end of the coming winter, Hezbollah will have acquired a dramatic capability for attack.
In the coming months, Israel might need to decide whether a preemptive attack is necessary to eliminate the new and ominous threat posed by Hezbollah’s changing arsenal.
• Reserve Brig. Gen. Eran Ortal of the Israel Defense Forces is a visiting scholar at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington.
Please read our comment policy before commenting.