- The Washington Times - Thursday, October 1, 2026

Federal agencies can donate or sell unneeded laboratory equipment, but some of it could pose public health and national security risks if bad actors use it to develop biological weapons, according to a new report.

The Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Agriculture have not assessed biosecurity risks associated with the disposal and sale of this type of equipment, according to a report from the Government Accountability Office, Congress’ watchdog.

Decontamination is critical, but that alone does not address the separate threat of bad actors acquiring and misusing the equipment, the GAO said.

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Risks include nefarious actors acquiring such equipment to create a biological weapon, obtain sensitive information or gain military advantage, according to the report released Thursday.

Over a four-year cycle, both departments sold 1,316 listings of unneeded laboratory equipment, nine of which — freeze dryers and mass spectrometers — were sold to individuals and companies in the U.S. and Canada, some of whom appeared to be resellers.

Those nine pieces of equipment were also on the Commerce Control List, which identifies items subject to export controls because they could be used by certain countries of concern.

The report found that Health and Human Services and the USDA did not report to the General Services Administration that the items were on the list, as required by federal regulations.

Health and Human Services’ disposal policy did not include the requirement to flag controlled items, though the USDA’s does, and the GSA property system has no dedicated field for identifying them.

As a result, the GSA and potential buyers may not know when an item is subject to export controls, which the report said risks harm to national security.

Experts also identified 16 equipment types of concern that are not export-controlled. The GAO found 251 items of those types sold at public auction and two donated over the four years.

The GAO used counterfeit documents and fictitious identities to acquire one HHS item, one USDA item at a public auction and two more USDA items through a state surplus-property agency using a fake nonprofit. None of the four was export-controlled, and the GAO did not take possession.

It recommended that the GSA create a standard way to flag controlled items, that Health and Human Services finalize its policy fix, and that HHS and the USDA each regularly assess biosecurity risks — all of which were agreed to by the agencies in some form.

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