- The Washington Times - Monday, November 16, 2026

SEOUL, South Korea — In the second half of the second Trump term, Japan and South Korea are — again — getting the vapors about the mercurial U.S. president’s security commitment to their region.

Those vapors are merited.

A core resentment animating the American voters who bought into Mr. Trump’s MAGA movement — along with aversion to open borders and deep-seated frustration at the shift of global manufacturing to China — was the massive U.S. military commitment to the defense of lower-spending allies.

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During Mr. Trump’s first term, negotiations on a more equitable “burden sharing” — the cost that nations pay to maintain U.S. troops and bases on their soil — were opened with both Seoul and Tokyo.

The negotiations soon deadlocked, leaving it to the incoming Biden administration to finalize burden-sharing increases with both nations.

Japan’s current cost-sharing agreements expire in fiscal year 2027, leading to a new, current round of Tokyo-Washington talks.

In recent days, alarmed Japanese media have reported that Washington is demanding a threefold increase.

Meanwhile in Korea, the Biden-era cost-sharing agreement runs through 2030, granting a four-year breathing space.

The more pressing concern in Seoul is a seismic command-change process, also set to be emplaced by 2030.

Their fear is that the ongoing process, demanded by Seoul and greenlighted by the Trump administration, represents a Trojan Horse that will result in a significant cutback to Korea-based U.S. troop numbers.

Japan — pay up!

Over the past five days, multiple Japanese media outlets have raised the alarm over massive new cost-sharing demands from the U.S. side.

The Biden administration negotiated a five-year agreement under which Tokyo paid $6.7 billion between 2022 and 2026. Quiet working-level talks have been underway since the summer on the next steps, ahead of fiscal year 2027.

Japanese media – including national broadcaster NHK, leading newspaper the Asahi Daily, and newswire Kyodo – have reported over the past five days that Washington seeks to raise the $6.7 billion figure to $18.8 billion for the next five years.

Even if the reported number represents the U.S. side’s first-stage negotiating position, it represents a near tripling of the price tag Japan is being asked to pay for America’s protection.

No media outlet offered a source for its report. All variously stated that “they have learned” of the issue, or cited vague “diplomatic sources.”

That wording is code for leaks from Tokyo officialdom.

Much of the projected spend is likely to be invested in “resilience building,” Kyodo News reported, citing a “diplomatic source.”

That would include providing U.S. bases with underground defenses, and strengthening existing on-base building structures.

Japan is home for 54,000 GIs, more than in any other nation bar the U.S. itself.

The broad question for Tokyo is how much it values a U.S. troop presence. The question for Washington is how much it values forward deployment.

As an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” Japan’s islands are superbly situated to counter any future Chinese assault on Taiwan, as well as sensor observation and defense platforms for echeloned missile defense of the U.S. mainland.

The Japanese archipelago forms the key northeastern bastion of the First Island Chain — the democratic island nations whose geographic placement physically block Chinese naval assets’ path from their coastal ports to the blue-water Pacific.

Some voices have posited a U.S. abandonment of the First Island China and a withdrawal to a more defensible, but more distant defensive line deeper in the Pacific, the Second Island Chain.

That viewpoint was prominently restated by Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis at Washington think tank Defense Priorities, in her September paper, “A Second Island Chain Strategy for Asia.”

The paper, which fretted about U.S. overstretch in the region, generated a brouhaha among the punditry.

Japanese media turned to U.S. sources for commentary. One told vernacular tabloid Gendai, “This paper is relevant not only to the current Trump era, but more broadly, it looks ahead to the upcoming ’Vance Era,’” — assuming an election win by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance in 2028.

Korea: ’It was good while it lasted!’

In South Korea, President Lee Jae-myung’s oft-stated plan to take operational control of South Korean troops in wartime away from the current U.S.-led Combined Forces Command structure — OPCON transfer, for short — is underway, albeit with headwinds.

While some retired U.S. generals say Korea’s armed forces are not ready for OPCON transfer, multiple pundits in South Korea, including retired generals, have told this newspaper that the change would likely result in the collapse of the U.S.-led structure.

That would weaken the punch of the current bilateral alliance as the Combined Forces Command is widely regarded as highly effective. Unlike U.S. Forces in Japan, CFC ensures unity of bilateral command, unity of both nations’ forces — ground, naval, air and space — and a single command chain and mission.

On Oct. 5 and Oct. 13, debates held at Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, widely reported in South Korean media, went further.

Experts raised concerns that many in South Korea are reluctant to state on the record: That OPCON transfer could herald a significant U.S. troop withdrawal from the peninsula.

“It has been said, and I think said very credibly, that President Trump sees OPCON transition as a way to pull forces from the peninsula,” said CSIS Korea Chair Victor Cha.

South Korea hosts 28,500 American troops, their only boots on continental Asian soil, inside the First Island Chain.

That offers America priceless forward presence for electronic eyes and ears as well as airborne, ground and maritime muscle in a region where China, North Korea and Russia are all aligned against the U.S. and U.S. allies.

Although a troop drawdown would require congressional sign-off, Mr. Cha was dubious.

“The president is the commander-in-chief,” he said. “There are ways that the president can do things if he is so committed to that particular task.”

His views were echoed in South Korea by Moon Chung-in, a prominent academic who has advised the progressive governments which have engaged North Korea.

“The U.S. is changing, but we are clinging to an old America,” Mr. Moon said in a domestic media interview on Nov. 12. “The old America is gone.”

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