SEOUL, South Korea — Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang next week, both countries announced Friday.
Chinese and North Korean state media jointly released the dates of the trip — Monday and Tuesday — and stated that Mr. Kim extended the invitation.
Typically, no details were offered on their agenda, but pundits paint a complex picture of how Chinese relations with Russia, Taiwan and the United States could play out during Mr. Xi’s Pyongyang sojourn.
Next week’s jaunt is the latest fixture in Mr. Xi’s spate of high-profile global activities. He has projected public displays of national power while interacting with key counterparts with whom he positions China as a useful or essential counterparty.
In September, Mr. Xi hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin, Mr. Kim and other national leaders in Beijing at arguably the world’s most spectacular commemoration of the 80th anniversary of World War II’s conclusion.
More recently, he welcomed Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-wun to Beijing on April 10; U.S. President Trump on May 14; and Mr. Putin again on May 20.
For a leader who prefers hosting to visiting, it will be Mr. Xi’s first overseas trip of 2026, and his first to North Korea since 2019.
China’s policy toward a nation that has long provided a strategic buffer on its northeastern flank, but which is hardly a compliant client state, intersects with its wider regional and international relationships.
When meeting Mr. Kim, Mr. Xi may seek to do Mr. Trump a favor, one expert suggested.
“I’d think the [North Korea] visit was already discussed during his summit with Trump,” said Lee Dong-min, president of Seoul-based think tank the Peninsula Institute for Strategic Analysis. “There is a possibility he may hand-deliver a message from Trump and there may be talks about a new round of U.S.-North Korea talks.”
That would be reciprocity for Mr. Trump’s stance on Taiwan — a mission-critical issue for Mr. Xi.
Since the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing last month, Washington has gone quiet on Taiwan and the status of a planned U.S. arms dispatch to the democratic island is uncertain.
“The U.S. and China have different approaches on geopolitics, but as long as China is happy with the Taiwan issue, Beijing is likely to work closely with the U.S. on issues they are trying to find common ground on, and one may be North Korea,” Mr. Lee said. “This is risky for Taiwan.”
China has long kept North Korea’s economy afloat with aid and trade, but below the surface, relations have periodically been shaken by strategic distrust.
Chinese generals essentially took control over the Korean War after U.S.-led forces counter-invaded North Korea in late 1950, shunting aside Pyongyang’s defeated strategists.
Unlike U.S. troops, who remain in the South to this day, Chinese troops exited the North in 1958. But the two countries maintain a mutual defense treaty — with 2026 marking its 65th anniversary.
In 1992, Pyongyang was aggrieved when Beijing opened diplomatic relations with Seoul. In 2003, China sought to negotiate away North Korean nuclear arms via “Six-Party Talks,” which eventually foundered in 2007.
North Korean defectors say that Pyongyang is frequently irked by what it considers Beijing’s high-handedness.
However, in recent years, China’s relations with the U.S. have nosedived. As a result, and despite its permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, Beijing has softened its stance on sanctions and Mr. Kim’s nuclear arsenal, while extending Pyongyang diplomatic cover at the U.N.
China is the top economic partner of an increasingly war-torn Russia — which has, in turn, become an increasingly important patron of North Korea.
After North Korea and Russia reset bilateral relations in 2024, Mr. Kim was the only national leader to deploy troops to fight alongside Russia against Ukraine.
Some believe Pyongyang’s Moscow drift has expanded its political, economic and military elbow room, while reducing Beijing’s customary dominance.
In Pyongyang, Mr. Xi may reassert Chinese primacy in North Korea, perhaps by urging the full reopening of border crossings closed during COVID, and the resumption of pre-pandemic trade levels.
“90% of North Korean trade was with China, but now Russian assistance to North Korea may be worth $20 billion in needed items — energy, food, medicines and military technologies,” said Mr. Lee. “The status of Russia is much higher than China in Pyongyang at the moment.”
However, a Russian expert says that there is no Beijing-Moscow competition over Pyongyang: Beijing holds an obvious advantage.
“China’s economy is 10 times the size of Russia’s, and Russia’s economic performance depends on China,” said Andrei Lankov, a North Korean expert at Seoul’s Kookmin University.
Amid sanctions and isolation resulting from the Ukraine war, some Russian strategists fret over their deepening dependency on China.
“I don’t see why China would worry about excessive Russian influence,” Mr. Lankov continued. “If they did, they could fix it with a couple of phone calls to the Kremlin.”
He believes that Russia’s interactions with North Korea are conditional upon ongoing hostilities in Ukraine — hostilities that may end — and believes Mr. Kim knows this, too.
That realpolitik dynamic will likely simplify upcoming talks in Pyongyang.
“Kim wants good relations with his most reliable sponsor, and it’s always a good idea to meet your fund manager,” Mr. Lankov said. “China has deep interest in keeping North Korean as a buffer zone, so though Xi might like to see nuclear disarmament and reform, his logic is to make sure North Korea maintains the status quo.”
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