OPINION:
Chinese ruler Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea for meetings with Kim Jong-un attracted no shortage of coverage from Chinese and North Korean media.
Mr. Xi’s last visit was in 2019, and what a difference seven years makes when you are dealing with North Korea.
Mr. Xi received royal treatment during his two-day visit this month. Chinese and North Korean media coverage spoke of expanding cooperation in trade, agriculture, construction and technology, and of enhancing exchanges in diplomacy, law enforcement and military affairs.
Interestingly, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun and his North Korean counterpart, No Kwang-chol, also participated in some of the meetings.
During the visit to the North Korea-China Friendship Tower to honor fallen soldiers from the Korean War, Messrs. Xi and Kim stressed the importance of carrying forward their traditional friendship, with the “spirit of resistance against the U.S.”
Discounting the symbolism, what did China accomplish from the visit, the first foreign trip this year for Mr. Xi? A reaffirmation that North Korea is China’s only ally, pursuant to the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.
After Mr. Xi’s visit, it is likely that China will receive an impressive gift from North Korea: North Korea’s recommitment to a “One China” policy on Taiwan.
North Korea keeps China apprised of its military support to Russia for the war in Ukraine.
The visit also sent a message to President Trump that China retains considerable leverage over North Korea and any U.S. effort to seek rapprochement with North Korea will be transparent to Beijing and dependent on China’s support.
What did North Korea accomplish with Mr. Xi’s visit? De facto recognition that North Korea is a nuclear weapons state.
Mr. Kim accrued prestige from Mr. Xi’s visit, a likely uptick in trade and agricultural assistance pursuant to commitments Mr. Xi made during the visit, and likely closer collaboration between the Korean People’s Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army.
Clearly, what Mr. Kim got from the visit was the prestige of having two great powers, China and Russia, vie for North Korea’s attention.
The September 2025 Victory Day celebration in Beijing, with Mr. Kim standing next to Messrs. Xi and Putin — preceded by the visit of Mr. Putin to Pyongyang and now Mr. Xi’s visit to Pyongyang — all contribute to an enhanced profile for a North Korean leader building more nuclear weapons.
Those weapons can be mated to ballistic missiles capable of targeting South Korea, Japan and the U.S.
The U.S. was likely a focus in private discussions between these two leaders. Mr. Kim probably made the case for North Korea’s nuclear program and again overtly counseled against China, calling for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
In fact, Mr. Kim probably made it clear to Mr. Xi that the construction of the new uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon was a message to the U.S.: The nuclear complex now has a facility spinning sophisticated centrifuges to produce more highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the Yongbyon facility was the facility that Mr. Kim offered to dismantle in February 2019 at the Hanoi summit with Mr. Trump, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed in 2016 and 2017. Mr. Kim’s message to the U.S.: You missed an opportunity, and now we will use this new highly enriched uranium facility to build more nuclear weapons.
Having a friendly North Korea as a buffer state, with South Korea aligned with the U.S., is important to Beijing. Expecting China to facilitate contact between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim is unrealistic and not in China’s interest.
The ball is now in America’s court.
• The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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