Time to address the North Korean nuclear threat

Commentary

By Joseph R. DeTrani - Tuesday, July 28, 2026

OPINION:

North Korea is now strategically closer to Russia and China than at any other time since the Korean War. Meanwhile, the United States is doing nothing to challenge the growing power of the axis of authoritarians: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

The irony is that North Korea has, since 1994, wanted a normal relationship with the U.S., yet the U.S. appears incapable of addressing the North Korean nuclear threat.

On July 19, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and declared that North Korea “stands by Moscow until victory in the war with Ukraine is achieved. Ties with Russia are a strategic priority for Pyongyang.”

I worked with Ms. Choe, a fluent English speaker, from 2003 to 2016, and I know that she and others would prefer to engage in dialogue with the U.S.

From July 10 to 12, North Korean Premier Pak Thae-song was in Beijing meeting with Wang Huning — chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the fourth-highest member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party — for the 65th anniversary of China’s defense treaty with North Korea.

The visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Beijing in September 2025 to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping and participate in the Victory Day parade with Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin, followed by Mr. Xi’s recent visit to North Korea, is a clear indicator that North Korea is working hard to improve relations with China.

North Korea is simultaneously maintaining a close military relationship with Russia.

Russia is reportedly asking for another 30,000 troops and ballistic missile launchers from North Korea. The additional North Korean troops would reinforce frontline operations, doubling previous deployment estimates. This is happening as North Korea prepares to transfer new ballistic missile launchers to Russia.

The deepening military cooperation with Moscow, pursuant to the 2024 mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea, is a growing threat not only to Ukraine but also to the Asian nations within range of North Korean missiles.

I have often written in this column about North Korea’s growing arsenal of nuclear weapons — more than 100 by 2030 — and the sophistication of its ballistic missiles, especially the long-range ones, all capable of targeting the U.S.

Recently, we discussed progress with nuclear-powered submarines, but not the progress North Korea is making in establishing a nuclear triad: land-, sea- and air-based nuclear weapons. With Russia’s assistance, this is achievable in the not-too-distant future.

What are we doing to address this growing threat? We are watching the axis of authoritarian states become more united and seemingly forgetting that, since 1994, North Korea has wanted a normal relationship with the U.S.

Yet after the failed February 2019 Hanoi Summit and the June 2019 symbolic Demilitarized Zone meeting, there were no further substantive developments with North Korea.

Since 2020, our failed policy of “strategic patience” has kicked in, and North Korea has exponentially increased its arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. It has also embraced Russia with a mutual defense treaty and military assistance for the invasion of and ongoing war in Ukraine.

It is time for the U.S., with support from its allies in South Korea and Japan, to decide whether we want a normal relationship with North Korea — one that will weaken the axis of authoritarian states — or to continue our “do-nothing” policy toward the country.

If we want to do something, that means recognizing North Korea de facto as a nuclear weapons state — a reality we cannot deny — and entering into negotiations with Pyongyang to get North Korea to stop building more nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

In exchange, we can lift sanctions, provide economic development assistance and start down a path toward normal bilateral relations.

• The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.