OPINION:
North Korea now reportedly has 60 to 120 nuclear warheads, with a vast arsenal of short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles to deliver them to South Korea, Japan and the U.S.
The country can also sell these weapons or fissile material to rogue states or terrorist organizations, or provide the technology to rogue states, as it did with Syria.
This is in sharp contrast with Sept. 19, 2005, when the State Department announced that the fourth round of six-party talks held in Beijing had moved closer to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. North Korea had committed to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and at an early date, returning to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.”
The U.S. said that “it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons.”
Despite this progress, North Korea was suspected of pursuing a secret, highly enriched uranium program for nuclear weapons at one or more uranium enrichment sites. Having the IAEA back in North Korea could help determine whether Pyongyang had such secret facilities.
However, North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 after refusing to give the IAEA monitors access to suspected sites.
It was North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program that led to the collapse of the six-party talks. Clearly, North Korea wanted nuclear weapons capability and was prepared to jeopardize the prospect of eventual normalization of relations with the U.S. to get it.
Now we must pursue several goals: getting North Korea to halt its overt production of fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and agree to a moratorium on the construction of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un offered this to President Trump at the 2019 Hanoi summit in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed in 2016. Mr. Trump responded with the request that Mr. Kim declare all his nuclear facilities; Mr. Kim refused, ending the Hanoi summit.
Assuming that Mr. Kim is prepared to meet with Mr. Trump and offers to dismantle all programs at Yongbyon, as he did at the Hanoi summit, it would be a step in the right direction.
Since that summit in 2019, North Korea has forged ties with Russia, emboldening Mr. Kim. The nation has a mutual defense treaty, with Russia reportedly providing North Korea with nuclear, missile and satellite assistance in exchange for combat troops, artillery shells and ballistic missiles for Russia’s war with Ukraine.
An emboldened North Korea will make any negotiation with Mr. Kim more difficult.
Although Mr. Kim’s sister Kim Yo-jong made clear that Mr. Trump’s decision to scale back the recent joint military exercises with South Korea had not changed the “provocative and aggressive” nature of these exercises, it is Mr. Kim who will make the final decision regarding another meeting with Mr. Trump.
Resuming the dialogue between Messrs. Trump and Kim could change the current trajectory of North Korea building more nuclear weapons and missiles while providing extensive military assistance to Russia for its war with Ukraine.
There is historical precedent for such an eventuality. In 1989, South Africa abandoned its secret nuclear weapons program after experiencing biting economic sanctions. Plus, the government in Cape Town wanted to end its pariah status in the global community.
This suggests that the lifting of sanctions and the restoration of international legitimacy, including access to international financial institutions, could be important for North Korea. A normal relationship with the U.S. would be a step in that direction.
North Korea halting its nuclear and missile programs and possibly agreeing to cease its military support to Russia for its war with Ukraine are goals worthy of pursuing. They will require U.S. flexibility on sanctions relief and a path toward the normalization of bilateral relations.
It will take considerable time, but an interim moratorium on Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs may be achievable in the short term if there is another meeting between Messrs. Trump and Kim.
• The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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