OPINION:
Ukraine’s reconstruction will be the largest rebuilding effort in Europe since World War II. But as of now, the United States has no strategy to lead it — while China is positioning itself to control Ukraine’s future economic foundation.
Though the war seems far from over, whenever it does end, as things stand, the United States will start the reconstruction race miles behind. Washington is helping Ukraine survive the war — but for what? If the U.S. sleeps through the rebuilding, Ukraine is likely to remain broken or be brought back to life in Beijing’s shadow
In either case, the “no limits” partners — Russia and China — will have won regardless of the battlefield outcome. China already has a footprint in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. At the Karansky Quarry near Mariupol, a crushed-stone operation idle since 2008 is running again on Chinese machinery, supplied based on agreements struck in 2023. This quarry is just a preview.
Chinese companies are moving into energy, agriculture and light industry inside the occupied territories. Financial infrastructure is being laid alongside them: Some 79 bank branches there now handle yuan transactions and in some areas the yuan is the second-most common currency after the ruble.
Beijing is also engaging with Kyiv through companies such as telecom giant Huawei. It is setting up the infrastructure necessary to become the preferred partner before bidding for reconstruction projects even begins. In December 2025, the head of the Moldova-China Chamber of Commerce pitched Moldova as a logistics hub for Chinese firms involved in Ukraine’s reconstruction.
Beijing has been transparent with its interest in rebuilding Ukraine ever since launching its peace plan proposal one year into Russia’s full-scale invasion. Washington, meanwhile, is focused on only one part of the scoreboard: the war. This is necessary work. But no one owns the reconstruction question.
The interagency effort is disorganized with no dedicated envoy to drive it. By contrast, France, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria already have one — though these efforts likely will also struggle to outcompete China.
Washington is not pushing Ukraine to build institutional tools to keep out investment from adversaries. Ukraine has no equivalent of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), no way to screen strategic acquisitions on national-security grounds. Its procurement process is designed to reward the lowest bid, although legislative measures have been considered to introduce such screening.
In some cases, past lack of scrutiny can mean future costs — as the European Union will not fund certain projects related to high-risk companies and EU accession may require cutting off security-risk companies involved in 5G connectivity. A Ukrainian screening commission and a procurement process that could reject cheap but compromising suppliers are needed before the reconstruction money even arrives.
The World Bank’s 2026 assessment puts Ukraine’s reconstruction needs at nearly $588 billion over the next decade, almost three times its entire 2025 GDP. Set that against what Western-led recovery conferences have delivered. The 2026 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Gdansk generated more than 160 agreements worth more than $11.4 billion; the 2025 conference in Rome produced roughly $4 billion.
Five conferences in, the pledges are a rounding error against the need. A gap that large will not stay empty. It will be filled by whoever has budgetary room and logistical capability and sees a path to profit.
China, which has showed through its Belt and Road Initiative that it can marshal resources at continental scale, is the obvious candidate.
What ships alongside the machinery and materials for Chinese reconstruction of Ukraine is dependency: opaque contracting, corruption and surveillance-capable infrastructure that will interconnect with European systems for decades. This will be especially true as Ukraine moves toward EU membership.
Beijing believes that it can transition from Moscow’s indispensable economic backer to a critical reconstruction partner in Ukraine by buying soft power on NATO’s doorstep — without being held to account for enabling Europe’s largest war this century. Sending dual-use goods to Moscow, providing trade relief and sending hard currency in exchange for Russian energy products should disqualify China from playing both sides.
Beijing must not benefit from reconstruction contracts for the very infrastructure it helped destroy. The U.S. empowered Ukraine’s fight to escape one dictatorship. It cannot let it slide into the economic orbit of another.
• Antonia-Laura Pup is a Fulbright scholar from Romania and previously interned with the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Angela Howard is a research analyst at CEFP and previously served as a project coordinator with the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation.
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