Why the United States can’t leave Okinawa

OPINION:

Okinawa is in American headlines — usually when an American serviceman commits a horrific crime — an average of about once every 10 years. In this decade, there have been two serious incidents, but it had been nearly a decade before two occurred. For those not familiar with it, Okinawa is an island prefecture (equivalent of an American state) located at the intersection of the East China and Philippine Seas south of Japan proper. The vast majority its population are indigenous Ryukyuan, not native Japanese. The island was captured by U.S. forces in 1945 in the bloodiest battle of World War II in the Pacific. American forces have been stationed there ever since even though the island was reverted back to Japanese control in the mid-1970s.

Okinawans are a gentle and pacifistic people; much of their aversion to things military comes from the fact that a large portion of its population was killed in the World War II battle. The bases on the island are a major issue between the Okinawan prefectural government and Tokyo. Consequently, every serious crime committed by an American becomes a cat’s paw to support the Okinawan government’s efforts to get rid of American bases.

The reality is that American service personnel are remarkably good neighbors. The crime rate on U.S. bases there would be the envy of any small American city of equal population, and a very high percentage of the service people have their families with them. Despite the sensationalistic headlines, most Okinawans — though pacifists — are not anti-American. The issues associated with Okinawa are complicated, but they are Japanese-Okinawan in nature with Americans caught in the middle. The bases are the largest employer on Okinawa, but the Japanese pay the salaries and fund virtually all military construction. If the bases went away tomorrow, the island would suffer a crippling depression.

Much of the trouble stems from the perception by Okinawans that they are treated as second-class citizens by the Japanese. This allegation is not entirely unfounded, and Okinawans often make a comparison between themselves and Puerto Ricans. The difference is that Puerto Rico can declare independence any time it wants. Okinawa does not have that option. Unlike Puerto Rico, Okinawans are full participants in all Japanese elections, but Okinawans feel that they suffer a tyranny of the majority under Japanese rule.

Another problem is that for the last 30 or so years, the island’s elites, who hold most of the elective positions, are 1960s and ’70s radical-leftist graduates of the University of the Ryukyus who are both anti-Japanese and anti-American. They are essentially “one trick ponies” and that trick is getting rid of the American bases.

Ironically, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1990s, the strategic value of Okinawa came into question in Washington as the Soviet Union collapsed and relations with China and North Korea seemed to be improving. Some military planners — this writer among them — questioned the continued strategic value of Okinawa. The Japanese government strongly argued the case for continued American presence, and they were more prescient than their American counterparts. Starting at the turn of the century, the nuclearization of North Korea and the rising of China in the nearby South China Sea highlighted the strategic importance of Okinawa.

The bottom line here is that Okinawa is again key to U.S. and Japanese strategy in the Pacific. Both governments will continue to do their best to lessen the impact on individual Okinawans, but this is a case of the good of the many trumping the disapproval of a few. Some Okinawans view themselves as subjects rather than as citizens of Japan. That’s sad, but it doesn’t change strategic reality.

Other than the air bases, the real value of Okinawa is the Marine Corps logistics facility, which would be crucial in any Pacific conflict. In an effort to reduce tensions, the Marines have moved much of their combat- and live-fire training off island and distributed many units to other locations in the Pacific, such as Guam and Australia. However, there is no accounting for stupidity. The sailor involved in the latest incident was attached to a Marine Corps unit, and had been involved in domestic violence with the Okinawan victim before. He should have been sent home, and the members of his chain of command who knew about it will be dealt with accordingly. To err is human and to forgive is divine; neither of which is Marine Corps policy.

• Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps colonel. He commanded Camp Hansen, the largest base on the island following the 1995 rape of an Okinawan school girl by three American servicemen.